ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The concept of conditional independence between two subsets of variables given a third has been extensively studied in probability theory [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . The concept of conditional independence in probability theory has been interpreted in terms of relevance. If r, s, and t are subsets of variables, then to say that r and s are conditionally independent given t, means that the conditional distribution of r, given any values of s and t, is governed by the value of t alonefurther information about the value of s is irrelevant.
The concept of conditional independence for variables has also been studied in Spohn's epistemic-belief theory [8, 9] . However, the concept of conditional independence for variables has not been studied in Dempster-Shafer's theory of belief functions [10, 11] or in Zadeh's possibility theory [12, 13] . 1 An axiomatic framework that unifies various uncertainty calculi is that of valuation-based systems [20, 21, 24] . In valuation-based systems (VBS), knowledge about a set of variables is represented by a valuation for that set of variables. There are three operations in VBS that are used to make inferences. These are called combination, marginalization, and removal. Combination represents aggregation of knowledge. Marginalization represents coarsening of knowledge. And removal represents disaggregation of knowledge.
The VBS framework is able to uniformly represent probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possibility theory. In this paper, we develop the notion of conditional independence for variables in the VBS framework. One advantage of this generality is that all results developed here apply uniformly to all uncertainty calculi that fit in the VBS framework. Thus the results described in this paper apply to, for example, probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possibility theory.
What does it mean for two subsets of variables to be conditionally independent given a third subset? Conditional independence can be described in terms of factorization of the joint valuation. Suppose r, s, and t are disjoint subsets of variables. Suppose τ is a valuation for r∪s∪t. We say r and s are conditionally independent given t with respect to τ if and only if the valuation τ factors into two valuations, one whose domain involves variables in r∪t, and the other whose domain involves only variables in s∪t.
The conditional independence relation between subsets of variables in probability theory satisfies many different properties. Pearl and Paz [4] have isolated a subset of these properties called the "graphoid axioms." The graphoid axioms are important because they are also satisfied by many ternary relations besides probabilistic conditional independence. In this paper we show that the definition of conditional independence we propose in the VBS framework satisfies the graphoid axioms.
An outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the VBS framework. The VBS framework was described earlier in [20, 21, 24] . In this paper we extend the framework by defining two new sets of valuations called normal, and positive normal. As we will see, the concept of normal valuations is required for the definition of conditional independence, and the concept of positive normal valuations is required to prove the intersection property of conditional independence. Also, we introduce a new operation called removal. The removal operation is required for the definition of conditional valuations. Many of the properties of conditional independence are stated using conditional valuations. The exposition in this section is quite abstract. The reader may want to glance ahead at Sections 4-7 for specific examples of each definition in the VBS framework.
In section 3, we define conditional independence for sets of variables. We show that this definition satisfies some well-known properties that have been stated by Dawid [1, 22] , Spohn [2] , Lauritzen [3] , Smith [5] , and Pearl and Paz [4] in the context of probability theory. Using Pearl and Paz's terminology, the conditional independence relation in VBS is a graphoid.
In section 4, we show how probability theory fits in the VBS framework. In particular, we define valuations, zero valuations, proper valuations, normal valuations, positive normal valuations, combination, marginalization, and removal. We also verify that all axioms and assumptions made in Section 2 are satisfied by our definitions.
In section 5, we show how Dempster-Shafer's theory of belief functions fits in the VBS framework. In section 6, we show how Spohn's epistemic-belief theory fits in the VBS framework. In section 7, we show how Zadeh's possibility theory fits in the VBS framework. Finally, in section 8, we make some concluding remarks.
THE VALUATION-BASED SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the valuation-based systems (VBS) framework. In VBS, we represent knowledge by entities called variables and valuations. We infer conditional independence relations using three operations called combination, marginalization, and removal. We use these operations on valuations.
The VBS framework is described in [20, 21, 24] . The motivation there was to describe a local computational method for computing marginals of the joint valuation. In this paper, we embellish the VBS framework by introducing two new sets of valuations called normal, and positive normal, and by introducing a new operation called removal. Our motivation here is to define conditional independence and describe its properties.
Variables. We assume there is a finite set X whose elements are called variables. Variables are denoted by upper-case Latin alphabets, X, Y, Z, etc. Subsets of X are denoted by lower-case Latin alphabets, r, s, t, etc.
Valuations. For each s ⊆ X, there is a set V s . We call the elements of V s valuations for s. Let V denote ∪{V s | s ⊆ X}, the set of all valuations. If σ ∈V s , then we say s is the domain of σ.
Valuations are denoted by lower-case Greek alphabets, ρ, σ, τ, etc.
Valuations are primitives in our abstract framework and, as such, require no definition. But as we shall see shortly, they are objects that can be combined, marginalized, and removed. Intuitively, a valuation for s represents some knowledge about variables in s. In probability theory, e.g., a valuation for s is a function from the frame for s to the non-negative real numbers. Intuitively, a zero valuation represents knowledge that is internally inconsistent, i.e., knowledge that is a contradiction, or knowledge whose truth value is always false. In probability theory, for example, a zero valuation is a function that is identically zero. The concept of zero valuations is important in the theory of consistent knowledge-based systems [23] .
Proper Valuations. For each s ⊆ X, there is a subset P s of V s -{ζ s }. We call the elements of P s proper valuations for s. Let P denote ∪{P s | s ⊆ X}, the set of all proper valuations.
Intuitively, a proper valuation represents knowledge that is partially coherent. By coherent knowledge, we mean knowledge that has well-defined semantics.
The concept of proper valuations has substance (i.e., P s is a proper subset of V s -{ζ s }) only in Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory. In Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory, a valuation for s is a function from the power set of the frame for s to the non-negative real numbers, and a proper valuation is an unnormalized commonality function. This is explained in detail in Section 5. In probability theory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possibility theory, P s = V s -{ζ s }. Proper valuations play no role either in the definitions, or in the characterizations, or in the properties of conditional independence. The only role of proper valuations is in the semantics of knowledge.
Normal Valuations. For each s ⊆ X, there is another subset N s of V s -{ζ s }. We call the elements of N s normal valuations for s. Let N denote ∪{N s | s ⊆ X}, the set of all normal valuations. Intuitively, a normal valuation represents knowledge that is also partially coherent, but in a sense that is different from proper valuations. In probability theory, e.g., a normal valuation is a function whose values add to 1. We call the elements of P∩N proper normal valuations. Intuitively, a proper normal valuation represents knowledge that is completely coherent, i.e., knowledge that has well-defined semantics. For example, in probability theory, a proper normal valuation is a probability distribution function, and in Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory, a proper normal valuation is a commonality function.
Combination. 2 We assume there is a mapping ⊕:V×V → N∪Z, called combination, that satisfies the following four axioms: Axiom C1 (Domain): If ρ ∈V r and σ ∈V s , then ρ⊕σ ∈V r∪s ; Axiom C2 (Associative): ρ⊕(σ⊕τ) = (ρ⊕σ)⊕τ; Axiom C3 (Commutative): ρ⊕σ = σ⊕ρ; and Axiom C4 (Zero): Suppose zero valuations exist, and suppose σ ∈V s . Then ζ r ⊕σ = ζ r∪s .
If ρ⊕σ, read as ρ plus σ, is a zero valuation, then we say that ρ and σ are inconsistent. If ρ⊕σ is a normal valuation, then we say that ρ and σ are consistent.
Intuitively, combination corresponds to aggregation of knowledge. If ρ and σ are valuations for r and s representing knowledge about variables in r and s, respectively, then ρ⊕σ represents the aggregated knowledge about variables in r∪s. In probability theory, e.g., combination corresponds to pointwise multiplication followed by normalization (see Section 4 for a precise definition).
An implication of Axiom C2 is that when we have multiple combinations of valuations, we can write it without using parenthesis. valuations is important because the intersection property of conditional independence only holds for positive normal valuations (as shown in the next section). In probability theory, e.g., positive normal valuations correspond to strictly positive probability distributions. Figure 1 shows the relation between different types of valuations. Valuations for the Empty Set. We assume that the set N Ø consists of exactly one element (Axiom C6). 3 This axiom implies that U Ø = N Ø = {ι Ø } where ι Ø is the identity valuation for the semigroup N ∅ ∪{ζ ∅ }. In probability theory, e.g., ι ∅ corresponds to the constant 1.
Marginalization. We assume that for each nonempty s ⊆ X, and for each X ∈ s, there is a mapping ↓(s−{X}): V s → V s-{X} , called marginalization to s-{X}, that satisfies the following six axioms:
Axiom M1 (Order of Deletion): Suppose σ ∈V s , and suppose X 1 , X 2 ∈ s. Then Axiom CM1 states that the computation of (ρ⊕σ) ↓((r∪s)-{X}) can be accomplished without having to compute ρ⊕σ. The combination ρ⊕σ is a valuation for r∪s whereas the combination
) is a valuation for (r∪s)-{X}. The following lemma is an easy consequence of Axiom CM1. (ii). σ⊕ι r = (σ⊕ι r )⊕ι ∅ = (σ⊕ι ∅ )⊕ι r = σ⊕ι ∅ .
(iii). Suppose τ ∈N r∪s . Then from Axiom CM2, τ⊕(ι s ⊕ι r ) = (τ⊕ι s )⊕ι r = τ⊕ι r = τ. If τ = ζ r∪s , then from Axiom C4, τ⊕(ι s ⊕ι r ) = ζ r∪s ⊕(ι r ⊕ι s ) = ζ r∪s = τ. Therefore ι s ⊕ι r must be the identity for N r∪s ∪{ζ r∪s }, i.e., ι s ⊕ι r = ι r∪s .
(iv). Suppose ρ ∈N r , and suppose r ⊆ s. We need to show that ρ⊕ι s We call σρ, read as σ minus ρ, the valuation resulting after removing ρ from σ. Intuitively, σρ can be interpreted as follows. If σ and ρ represent some knowledge, and if we remove the knowledge represented by ρ from σ, then σρ describes the knowledge that remains. In probability theory, e.g., removing corresponds to pointwise division followed by normalization (see Section 4 for a precise definition).
Axioms R2 and CR define the removal operation as an "inverse" of the combination operation in the sense that arithmetic division is inverse of arithmetic multiplication, and in the sense that arithmetic subtraction is inverse of arithmetic addition. The following lemma describes some implications of Axioms R1, R2, and CR. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
(ii). Let σ ∈V s , and r ⊆ s. Then, σι r = (σι r )⊕ι r = σ⊕(ι r ι r ) = σ⊕ι ι r = σ⊕ι r = σ⊕ι ∅ .
The following lemma describes two properties of inverses.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose σ ∈V, ρ ∈N∪Z.
(ii). σρ = σ⊕ρ −1 .
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
The following lemma states an important consequence of Axioms R1, R2, CR, and CM1.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose σ ∈V s , ρ ∈N r ∪Z r , X ∈ s, and X ∉ r. Then
ρ.
Proof of Lemma 2.5: Suppose σ ∈V s , ρ ∈V r , X ∈ s, and X ∉ r. Then (σρ)
ρ. The following lemma states some important properties of conditional valuations.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose σ ∈N s , and suppose a, b, and c are disjoint subsets of s.
Proof of Lemma 2.6: 5 If we assume that u is closed under combination, then statement (i) of Lemma 2.4 implies that (u, ⊕) is an Abelian (commutative) group [28] . One implication of this is that if ρ, σ ∈u, then (ρ⊕σ)
Also, if π ∈v, and θ, ρ ∈u, then π (θ⊕ρ) = (πθ)ρ, and π (θρ) = (πθ)⊕ρ.
(v). This follows directly from (iii) and (iv).
CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE
In this section, we define conditional independence in terms of factorization of the joint valuation. Also, we show that this definition implies the well-known properties of conditional independence in probability theory [1, 2, 3] and in other domains [4, 5, 29] . The essence of conditional independence is as follows. Suppose r, s, and v are disjoint subsets. We say r and s are conditionally independent given v with respect to a valuation τ if and only if τ ↓(r∪s∪v) factors into two valuations α r∪v ∈V r∪v , and α s∪v ∈V s∪v .
The definition of conditional independence is either objective or subjective depending on whether we have an objective or subjective measure of knowledge represented by valuation τ. In probability theory for example, in some cases, we start with an objective specification of a joint probability distribution of all variables. This joint probability distribution then serves as an objective measure of knowledge, and all statements of conditional independence are objective with respect to this state of knowledge. In other cases, however, we do not start always with a joint probability distribution. In such cases, the first task is to specify a joint probability distribution. To make this specification task simpler, we make assertions of conditional independence that are necessarily subjective. However, once we have a specification of a joint probability distribution (obtained either objectively or subjectively), all further statements of conditional independence are necessarily objective with respect to the joint probability distribution.
If τ is normal, statement (i) of Lemma 2.6 tells us that τ(a) = τ ↓a . In this case, we will use the simpler and more intuitive conditional notation to denote the marginals, i.e., we will use, for example, τ(a) in place of τ ↓a . Definition 3.1 (Conditional Independence). Suppose τ ∈N w , and suppose r, s, and v are disjoint subsets of w. We say r and s are conditionally independent given v with respect to τ, written as r ⊥ τ s | v, if and only if there exist α r∪v ∈V r∪v , and α s∪v ∈V s∪v such that τ(r∪s∪v) = α r∪v ⊕α s∪v .
When it is clear that all conditional independence statements are with respect to τ, we simply say 'r and s are conditionally independent given v' instead of 'r and s are conditionally independent given v with respect to τ,' and use the simpler notation r ⊥ s | v instead of r ⊥ τ s | v.
Also, if v = ∅, we say 'r and s are independent' instead of 'r and s are conditionally independent given ∅' and use the simpler notation r ⊥ s instead of r ⊥ s | ∅.
We make four observations about our definition of conditional independence. First, notice that α r∪v and α s∪v are arbitrary valuations, they need not be normal. τ is necessarily normal.
Second, notice that we do not use the removal operation in the definition of conditional independence. If there is a removal operation as defined in the previous section, then we can characterize conditional independence in terms of conditionals. This is done in Lemma 3. (ii). τ(r∪s | v) = β r∪v ⊕β s∪v , where β r∪v ∈V r∪v , and β s∪v ∈V s∪v .
(viii). τ(r | s∪v) = α r∪v ⊕ι τ(s∪v) , where α r∪v ∈V r∪v .
Proof of Lemma 3.1: We will prove that (i) implies (ii), (ii) implies (iii), ..., (vii) implies (i).
To prove (i) implies (ii), suppose τ(r∪s∪v) = α r∪v ⊕α s∪v , where α r∪v ∈V r∪v , and . Deleting variables in r∪s from both sides of τ(r∪s∪v) = β r∪v ⊕β s∪v ⊕τ(v), we get τ(v) = β r∪v ↓v ⊕β s∪v ↓v ⊕τ(v).
Removing τ(v) from both sides of the preceding equality,
To prove (v) implies (vi), suppose τ(r∪s∪v)⊕τ(v) = τ(r∪v)⊕τ(s∪v). Removing τ(v) from both sides, we get τ(r∪s∪v) = τ(r∪v)⊕τ(s∪v)τ(v) = τ(r | v)⊕τ(s∪v). To prove that (vi) implies (vii), suppose τ(r∪s∪v) = τ(r | v)⊕τ(s∪v). Removing τ(s∪v) from both sides of the equality, we get τ(r∪s∪v)τ(s∪v) = (τ(r | v)⊕τ(s∪v))τ(s∪v), i.e., τ(r | s∪v) = τ(r | v)⊕ι τ(s∪v) .
To prove that (vii) implies (viii), notice that τ(r | v) ∈V r∪v .
To prove that (viii) implies (i), suppose τ(r | s∪v) = α r∪v ⊕ι τ(s∪v) , where α r∪v ∈V r∪v . Adding τ(s∪v) to both sides of the equality, we get τ(r∪s∪v) = α r∪v ⊕ι τ(s∪v) ⊕τ(s∪v) = α r∪v ⊕τ(s∪v).
The result now follows from Definition 3.1. ■
The following corollary to Lemma 3.1 gives three characterizations of the independence relation. We know from probability theory that functions of independent random variables are independent. If X 1 and X 2 are independent random variables, then f(X 1 ) and g(X 2 ) are also independent random variables. More generally, if X 1 , …, X n are conditionally independent given X, {N 1 , ..., N k } is a partition of the set {X 1 , …, X n }, and Y j is a function of the X i in N j , then Y 1 , …, Y k are conditionally independent given X. The following lemma makes an analogous statement. . Therefore, ⊥{s 1 , ..., s k } | v.
■
The statement in the following theorem is called decomposition by Pearl [30] . It is a special case of Lemma 3.2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4: We will prove that (i) implies (ii), (ii) implies (iii), ..., (iv) implies (i).
That (i) implies (ii) follows directly from Lemma 3.2. That (iii) implies (iv) follows directly from Lemma 3.2.
To prove (ii) implies (iii), we will prove (ii) implies (i), and (i) implies (iii). Suppose
To show (iv) implies (i), suppose r i ⊥ (r 1 ∪...∪r i-1 ) | v for i = 2, ..., n. We are given ⊥{r 1 , r 2 } | v. It suffices to show that if ⊥{r 1 , ..., r j-1 } | v, then ⊥{r 1 , ..., r j } | v. The proof of this latter assertion is similar to the proof given above to show (ii) implies (i). ■ Theorem 3.3 states another property of conditional independence. This property is called weak union by Pearl [30] . where α r∪v ∈V r∪v , and α s∪t∪v ∈V s∪t∪v . Therefore τ(r∪s∪t∪v) = = α r∪v ⊕α s∪t∪v = (α r∪v ⊕α s∪t∪v )⊕ι t = (α r∪v ⊕ι t )⊕α s∪t∪v . Since α r∪v ⊕ι t ∈V r∪t∪v , and α s∪t∪v ∈V s∪t∪v , the result follows. ■ Theorem 3.4 states another property of conditional independence. This property is called contraction by Pearl [30] . 
■
The next theorem states a property of conditional independence that holds only if the joint valuation τ is positive normal. This property is called intersection by Pearl [30] . . Since τ is positive normal, τ(s∪t∪v) is positive normal. Therefore ι τ(s∪t∪v) = ι s∪t∪v = ι s ⊕ι t∪v . Therefore, τ(r | s∪t∪v) = τ(r | t∪v)⊕ι s ⊕ι t∪v = τ(r | t∪v)⊕ι s . Similarly, since r ⊥ t | s∪v, τ(r | s∪t∪v) = τ(r | s∪v)⊕ι t . Since the left hand sides of the preceding two equalities are the same, the right hand sides must be equal, i.e., τ(r | t∪v)⊕ι s = τ(r | s∪v)⊕ι t . Adding τ(t∪v)⊕τ(s∪v) to both sides of the preceding equality, we get τ(r | t∪v)⊕ι s ⊕τ(t∪v)⊕τ(s∪v) = τ(r | s∪v)⊕ι t ⊕τ(t∪v)⊕τ(s∪v), i.e., τ(r∪t∪v)⊕τ(s∪v) = τ(r∪s∪v)⊕τ(t∪v). Deleting s from both sides of the preceding equality, we get τ(r∪t∪v)⊕τ(v) = τ(r∪v)⊕τ(t∪v), i.e., r ⊥ t | v. Earlier we had τ(r | s∪t∪v) = τ(r | t∪v)⊕ι s = τ(r | v)⊕ι t ⊕ι s . Therefore, τ(r | s∪t∪v)⊕τ(s∪t∪v) = [τ(r | v)⊕ι t ⊕ι s ]⊕τ(s∪t∪v), i.e., τ(r∪s∪t∪v) = τ(r | v)⊕τ(s∪t∪v). Therefore, r ⊥ s∪t | v. [4] call a conditional independence relation that satisfies symmetry, decomposition, weak union, contraction, and intersection a graphoid. From Theorems 3.1-3.5, it follows that the definition of conditional independence in Definition 3.1 is a graphoid.

Pearl and Paz
PROBABILITY THEORY
In this section, we show how probability theory fits in the VBS framework. More precisely, we define valuations, zero valuations, proper valuations, normal valuations, combination, marginalization, and removal. Also, we show that all axioms made in Section 2 hold. First we start with notation.
Frames and Configurations. We use the symbol W X for the set of possible values of a variable X, and we call W X the frame for X. We assume that one and only one of the elements of W X is the true value of X. We assume that all the variables in X have finite frames.
Given a nonempty set s of variables, let W s denote the Cartesian product of W X for X in s; W s = ×{W X | X ∈ s}. We call W s the frame for s. We call the elements of W s configurations of s. We use this terminology even when s is a singleton subset. Thus elements of W X are called configurations of X. We use lower-case, bold-faced letters such as x, y, etc., to denote configurations.
It is convenient to extend this terminology to the case where the set of variables s is empty. We adopt the convention that the frame for the empty set Ø consists of a single configuration, and we use the symbol ♦ to name that configuration; W Ø = {♦}.
Projection of Configurations.
Projection simply means dropping extra coordinates; for example, if (w,x,y,z) is a configuration of {W,X,Y,Z}, then the projection of (w,x,y,z) to {W,Y} is simply (w,y), which is a configuration of {W,Y}. If r and s are sets of variables, r ⊆ s, and x is a configuration of s, then x ↓r denotes the projection of x to r. If r = Ø, then of course, x ↓r = ♦.
If x is a configuration of r, y is a configuration of s, and r∩s = Ø, then there is a unique configuration z of r∪s such that z ↓r = x, and z ↓s = y. Let (x, y) or (y, x) denote z. As per this notation, (x, ♦) = (♦, x) = x.
In probability theory, the basic representational unit is called a probability function. A normal valuation can be regarded as a probability function defined only for singleton subsets.
Combination. In probability theory, combination is pointwise multiplication followed by normalization (if normalization is possible). Suppose ρ ∈V r , and σ ∈V s . Let K = Σ{ρ(x ↓r )σ(x ↓s ) | x ∈W r∪s }. The combination of ρ and σ, denoted by ρ⊕σ, is the valuation for r∪s given by 
for all y ∈W s-{X} .
The above definition of marginalization follows from condition (P2) in the definition of a probability function since a proposition {y} about variables in s-{X} is the same as proposition {y}×W X about variables in s.
It is easy to see that the definition of marginalization in (4.2) satisfies Axioms M1-M4. It can be easily shown that Axioms CM1 and CM2 hold.
Removal. In probability theory, removal is division followed by normalization (if normalization is possible). Division by zero can be defined arbitrarily. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, we define division of any real number by zero as resulting in zero. Suppose σ ∈V s , and ρ ∈N r ∪Z r . Let K = Σ{σ(x ↓s )/ρ(x ↓r ) | x ∈W r∪s s.t. ρ(x ↓r ) > 0}. Then the valuation resulting from the removal of ρ from σ, denoted by σρ, is the valuation for r∪s given by If K > 0, K is the normalization constant that ensures σρ is a normal valuation. It is easy to see that Axioms R1, R2, and CR hold. Suppose ρ ∈N r ∪Z r . The identity ι ρ for ρ defined in Axiom R2 is the normal valuation for r such that ι ρ (x) = K −1 if ρ(x) > 0, and ι ρ (x) = 0 if ρ(x) = 0, where K is the normalization constant. Does the VBS framework capture all aspects of probability theory? The answer is no. The VBS framework only captures the important features of probability theory. For example, Studeny [31] has proved the following property of conditional independence in probability theory: If r, s, t, and u are disjoint subsets of variables, then t ⊥ u | r∪s, t ⊥ u, r ⊥ s | t, and r ⊥ s | u if and only if r ⊥ s | t∪u, r ⊥ s, t ⊥ u | r, and t ⊥ u | s. However, Spohn [32] has shown that this property does not hold in his theory. Therefore, it is clear that the above property of conditional independence does not hold in the VBS framework.
DEMPSTER-SHAFER'S BELIEF-FUNCTION THEORY
In this section, we show how Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory fits in the VBS framework. More precisely, we define valuations, zero valuations, proper valuations, normal valuations, combination, marginalization, and removal. Also, we show that all axioms and assumptions made in Section 2 hold.
In Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory, proper normal valuations correspond to either basic probability assignment functions, belief functions, plausibility functions, or commonality functions. For simplicity of exposition, we describe Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory in terms of commonality functions. We define commonality functions in terms of basic probability assignment functions. Remember that 2 W s denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of W s .
Basic Probability Assignment Function. A basic probability assignment (bpa) function for s is a function
µ: 2 W s → [0, 1] such that (B1). µ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ 2 W s (B2). Σ{µ(a) | a ∈ 2 W s } = 1. Commonality Function. A function θ: 2 W s → [0, 1
] is a commonality function for s if there
exists a bpa function µ for s such that
It is evident from (B1), (B2), and (5.1) that 0 ≤ θ(a) ≤ 1, and that θ(a) ≥ θ(b) whenever a ⊆ b.
The following two lemmas from [33] will help us understand the mathematical properties of commonality functions. 
These lemmas can be proven by the methods used in the appendix of Ch. 2 of [11] . From Lemma 5.1, we see that a basic probability assignment is completely determined by the commonality function. From Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, and conditions (B1) and (B2), we see that a function θ:
] is a commonality function if and only if two conditions are satisfied:
for every a ∈ 2 W s , and In belief-function theory, combination is pointwise multiplication of commonality functions followed by normalization [11] . Before we can give a formal definition of combination, we need the definition of projection of subsets of configurations.
Projection of Subsets of Configurations. If r and s are sets of variables, r ⊆ s, and a ∈ 2 W s , then the projection of a to r, denoted by a ↓r , is the element of 2 W r given by a ↓r = {x ↓r | x ∈ a}.
Combination. Suppose ρ ∈V r and σ ∈V s . Let K = Σ{(−1) |a|+1 ρ(a ↓r )σ(a ↓s ) | a ∈ 2 W r∪s }. The combination of ρ and σ, denoted by ρ⊕σ, is the valuation for r∪s given by Marginalization. Suppose σ ∈V s , and suppose X ∈ s. The marginal of σ for s-{X}, denoted by σ ↓(s-{X}) , is the valuation for s-{X} defined as follows:
It is easy to see that the definition of marginalization in (5.5) satisfies Axioms M1-M4. It can be easily shown that Axioms CM1 and CM2 hold. Formal proofs that Axioms M1 and CM2 hold can be found in [34] .
Removal. We define removal as pointwise division followed by normalization (if normalization is possible). Division by zero can be defined arbitrarily. 
0
if K = 0 or ρ(a ↓r ) = 0 for all a ∈ 2 W r∪s .
If K > 0, K is the normalization constant that ensures σρ is a normal valuation. It can be easily shown that Axioms R1, R2, and CR hold. Suppose ρ ∈N r ∪Z r . The identity ι ρ for ρ defined in Axiom R2 is the normal valuation for r such that ι ρ (a) = K −1 if ρ(a) > 0, and ι ρ (a) = 0 if ρ(a) = 0, where K is the normalization constant.
Notice that if σ and ρ are commonality functions, it is possible that σρ may not be a commonality function because condition (5.2) may not be satisfied by σρ. In fact, if σ is a commonality function for s, and r ⊆ s, then even σσ ↓r may fail to be a commonality function.
This fact is the reason why we need the concept of proper valuations as distinct from nonzero and normal valuations in the general VBS framework. An implication of this fact is that conditionals may lack semantical coherence in the Dempster-Shafer's theory. This is the primary reason why conditionals are neither natural nor widely studied in the Dempster-Shafer's belieffunction theory.
SPOHN'S EPISTEMIC-BELIEF THEORY
In this section, we show how Spohn's epistemic-belief theory [8, 35, 36] Combination. In Spohn's theory, combination is simply pointwise addition followed by normalization [8, 36] . If ρ ∈V r , and σ ∈V s , then their combination, denoted by ρ⊕σ, is the valuation for r∪s given by (ρ⊕σ)(x) = ρ(x ↓r ) + σ(x ↓s ) -K (6.1) for all x ∈W r∪s , where K is a constant defined as follows:
K is the normalization constant that ensures that ρ⊕σ is a normal valuation.
It is easy to see that axioms C1-C6 are satisfied by the definition of combination in (6.1). The identity ι s for N s ∪{ζ s } is given by ι s (x) = 0 for all x ∈W s . Every normal valuation in N s has a unique identity in N s , therefore a normal valuation is also positive normal.
Marginalization. Suppose σ ∈V s , and suppose X ∈ s. The marginal of σ for s-{X}, denoted by σ ↓(s-{X})
, is the valuation for s-{X} defined as follows:
The above definition of marginalization follows from condition (D2) in the definition of a disbelief function since a proposition {y} about variables in s-{X} is the same as proposition {y}×W X about variables in s.
It is easy to see that the definition of marginalization in (6.2) satisfies Axioms M1-M4. It can be easily shown that Axioms CM1 and CM2 hold. Formal proofs that Axioms M1 and CM1 hold can be found in [36] .
Removal. In Spohn's theory, removal is subtraction followed by normalization [36] . Suppose σ ∈V s , and ρ ∈N r ∪Z r . Then the normal valuation resulting from the removal of ρ from σ, denoted by σρ, is given by
3) for all x ∈W r∪s , where K is a constant given by
K is the normalization constant that ensures σρ is a normal valuation. It can be easily shown that Axioms R1, R2, and CR hold. Suppose ρ ∈N r ∪Z r . Since every normal valuation is positive normal, ι ρ = ι r .
ZADEH'S POSSIBILITY THEORY
In this section, we describe how Zadeh's possibility theory [12, 13] 
Notice that from condition (S2) in the definition of a possibility function, a possibility function is completely determined by its values for singleton subsets.
A possibility function is a complete representation of a consistent possibilistic state [37] . a is possible in state π if and only if π(a) = 1, and a is not possible in state π if and only if π(a) < 1. A possibility function consists of more than a representation of a consistent possibilistic state. It also includes degrees to which proposition are possible and degrees to which propositions are not possible. π(a) can be interpreted as the degree to which proposition a is possible, and [1 − π(a)] can be interpreted as the degree to which proposition a is not possible, i.e., a is more possible than b if π(a) > π(b) and conversely, a is more impossible than b if π(a) < π(b) < 1.
In Suppose σ is a valuation for s. We say σ is normal if and only if MAX{σ(x) | x ∈W s } = 1. A normal valuation can be regarded as a possibility function defined only for singleton subsets.
Combination. 9 We define combination as multiplication followed by normalization (if normalization is possible). Suppose ρ ∈V r , and suppose σ ∈V Marginalization. Suppose σ ∈V s , and X ∈ s. The marginal of σ for s-{X}, denoted by σ ↓(s-{X}) , is the valuation for s-{X} defined as follows: σ ↓(s-{X}) (y) = MAX{σ(y,x) | x ∈W X } (7.2) 9 There are several definitions of combination in possibility theory. Zadeh [12] has defined combination as pointwise minimization (with no normalization). However, several alternative definitions of combination have been suggested in the fuzzy set literature (see, e.g., [13] , pp. 78-85). Any triangular norm can be regarded as a definition of combination. In the VBS framework, combination has to be associative, and the combination of two valuations has to be either normal or zero. These two requirements restrict the definition of combination to pointwise multiplication followed by normalization (since pointwise minimization followed by normalization, for example, fails to be associative).
The above definition of marginalization follows from condition (S2) in the definition of a possibility function since a proposition {y} about variables in s-{X} is the same as proposition {y}×W X about variables in s.
It is easy to see that the definition of marginalization in (7.2) satisfies Axioms M1-M4. It can be easily shown that Axioms CM1 and CM2 hold. Formal proofs that Axioms M1 and CM1 hold can be found in [37] .
Removal. In possibility theory, removal is division followed by normalization (if normalization is possible). Division by zero can be defined arbitrarily. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, we define division of any real number by zero as resulting in zero. Suppose σ ∈V s , ρ ∈N r ∪Z r . Suppose K = MAX{σ(x Most of the literature on Zadeh's possibility theory defines combination as pointwise minimization with no normalization. With this definition, combination is always idempotent, i.e., π⊕π = π, and consequently, conditional independence always holds for any disjoint subsets of variables. Therefore, conditional independence has not been widely studied in the possibility theory literature. A problem with the definition of combination as pointwise minimization with no normalization is that it is semantically inadequate. If we define combination as pointwise minimization with normalization, then combination is not associative. This poses other problems because now we have to worry about the sequence in which we combine possibility valuations and what the sequence represents. Our definition of combination as pointwise multiplication followed by normalization makes possibility theory more similar to probability theory and Spohn's epistemic-belief theory. In our version of possibility theory, possibility valuations are no longer idempotent and therefore the conditional independence theory is no longer trivial. We believe this version of possibility theory merits more study than it has received in the literature.
CONCLUSION
The main objective of this paper was to define conditional independence in the VBS framework. Although this concept has been defined and extensively studied in probability theory, it have not been extensively studied in non-probabilistic uncertainty theories.
Drawing upon the literature on conditional independence in probability theory [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] , we define conditional independence in VBS. The VBS framework was defined earlier by Shenoy [20, 21] . However, the VBS framework defined there is inadequate for the purposes of studying properties of conditional independence. In this paper, we embellish the framework by including three new classes of valuations called proper, normal, and positive normal, and by including a new operation called removal. The new definitions are stated in the form of axioms. These axioms are general enough to include probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belieffunction theory, Spohn's epistemic-belief theory, and Zadeh's possibility theory.
The VBS framework enables us to define conditional independence, and to prove some major properties of conditional independence that have been derived in probability theory. Conditional independence is defined in terms of factorization of the joint valuation. Thus, not only do we have a deeper understanding of conditional independence in probability theory, we also understand what conditional independence means in various non-probabilistic uncertainty theories. This should deflect some criticism that non-probabilistic uncertainty theories are not as well developed as probability theory. Also, the VBS framework allows us to translate results from probability theory to non-probabilistic uncertainty theories, and vice-versa.
